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ABSTRACT Revisionist historians of the Western Front have demonstrated 
that Britain had no alternative but to wage a war of attrition to defeat 
Germany. However, the effort to assess this process has been neglected in the 
historiography. This article explores British attempts to gauge the success of 
their strategy of wearing down German manpower. Efforts in London proved 
unable to supply a convincing answer. Using General Headquarters’ dubious 
estimates from the front, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig argued that his 
strategy was working. Prime Minister David Lloyd George’s inability to 
confound these estimates shaped his decision to permit the Passchendaele 
offensive. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Assessing the manpower resources of an enemy state in war, and the attrition inflicted 
upon it, is a challenging form of strategic assessment. Producing an accurate answer requires 
significant quantities of detailed and accurate intelligence, which is hard to find. Low-grade 
sources are unlikely to produce material of the required accuracy and specificity, which even 
high-level penetration may fail to gather, for the states under assessment may not know the 
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answers themselves. This article explores the efforts of the British government to assess the 
manpower of Germany, and its casualties, during the First World War. More specifically it 
analyzes the attempts of the Enemy Personnel Committee, a sub-committee of the Committee 
of Imperial Defence (CID) comprised of statisticians, intelligence, and operations staff, to 
solve this problem.2 Limits to sources produced an intelligence lacuna, forcing these people 
to rely on comparative methods and extrapolation from unreliable data, so producing 
estimates of dubious power. This reduced the value of their work to strategy-makers. This 
failure showed only that no reasoned answers could be found to these questions, which 
shaped the strategic debate in 1917 between the politicians, disenchanted with the strategy of 
attrition, and the generals, who insisted that it was working in Britain’s favor. While unable to 
solve the problem either, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, commander-in-chief of the British 
Expeditionary Force (BEF), confidently used his headquarters’ assessments of these issues to 
make his case for a major offensive in 1917. His confidence amidst the ignorance and 
uncertainty among other military and civilian decision-makers marked the launching of the 
Passchendaele offensive.3 
 The perceived British tradition of warfare in the 18th and 19th centuries, referred to as 
‘business as usual’, had focused on waging a largely maritime contest while financing the 
large armies of continental allies. Such a strategy exploited Britain’s superiority at sea to 
cripple continental foes economically by disrupting trade and seizing colonies. Wars therefore 
were won without significant costs in manpower, and territorial prizes proffered resources 
which augmented Britain’s position.4 The challenge presented by the Central Powers rapidly 
put paid to notions in London of conducting a ‘business as usual’ strategy by the end of 1914, 
however. While the Royal Navy would play a pivotal role in enabling the Entente powers to 
exploit their global resources and isolate the Central Powers via blockade, Britain also would 
need to raise a large continental army to support its allies, France and Russia, in a lengthy 
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war.5 Victory would turn on the destruction of the German army and its reserves, the center of 
gravity for the Central Powers.6 The strategy undertaken to achieve this end was attrition. 
Meanings of attrition varied at different times, but all required a large mobilization at home 
and the ultimate destruction of the German Army.7 In 1914 and into early 1915 Lord 
Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, understood better than most that this would be a 
long war, and set about raising ‘New Armies’ composed of volunteers.8 In the meantime he 
believed that the destruction of the enemy in battle was a distant objective, and it would be 
preferable for Britain to switch its attention to more immediately promising theaters. For 
now, attrition would take place on the Western Front in the form of ‘limited operations to 
grind down enemy strength or to repel German offensives’.9  
By the middle of 1915, both sides accepted ‘the inexorable of the logic of the war’: 
prolonged attrition was the only way to force a decision.10 In 1916, Kitchener and General Sir 
William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), were certain that a combined 
attritional offensive with the French army on the Western Front was essential to defeating 
Germany, and ensuring the continued survival of the Entente.11 The result was the Battle of 
the Somme. The heavy losses here caused David Lloyd George, Prime Minister from 
December 1916 onward, to seek alternatives to this costly wearing down process. However, 
there was no other option which promised victory: the German army must be destroyed in 
battle in order to win the war. The three great attritional battles of 1916 and 1917, the 
Somme, Arras, and Third Ypres, were part of ‘an essential process of wearing out the enemy’, 
and contributed to Germany’s ultimate collapse in 1918 following the failure of the German 
Spring Offensive and the Allies’ Hundred Days Offensive.12 This strategy of attrition imposed 
new demands on the British state, including the assessment of its own and enemy resources. 
Scholars largely have ignored this intelligence aspect of the grinding down of the Central 
Powers on all fronts. However, understanding whether a strategy is working is crucial to the 
4 
 
conduct of any war. By examining these efforts to assess attrition, this article seeks to 
illuminate the problems of strategic intelligence in a war of attrition, which states face even 
today. 
 This article also addresses an overlooked realm of civil-military friction in London at 
this time. The high-level civil-military clashes which occurred throughout the war over issues 
such as command and Allied co-operation – notably at the start of Lloyd George’s tenure as 
Prime Minister – are well-documented in the historiography.13 Yet assessing attrition rapidly 
became a battlefield of its own between professional soldiers and civilian experts, over both 
sources and methods utilized by the civilians, and the right of army intelligence to produce 
independent assessment, which was exercised at the front by Haig.14 This study focuses on 
the efforts to examine Germany, rather than Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman 
Empire, which the committee treated in less detail. Britain recognized that Germany was the 
most important of the Central Powers, for which it had greater facilities ‘for acquiring and 
testing information’.15 Lastly, the archival sources lack proceedings for 60% of the 
committee’s meetings. 
 
 
1914-15: THE FIRST EFFORTS 
 
 The bid to assess manpower and attrition began once it became apparent that the war 
would be a long slog. Throughout 1915, both sides increasingly saw ‘that this was a war of 
resources, and in particular of reserves’, which only could be won through the mobilization of 
‘all society’s resources and grinding down the enemy’s capacity and will to fight in a 
sustained war of attrition’.16 Even a leading critic of the strategy of attrition, Winston 
Churchill, agreed in late 1915 that it was unavoidable. However, London needed to answer 
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two critical questions if such a strategy was to be pursued effectively. The first was how 
many men Germany could put into the field. The second was how many men Germany had 
lost thus far. 
 Britain had a number of sources on these issues, primarily open ones. For the problem 
of total mobilizable manpower, the key source was the most recent census of Germany, 
conducted in 1910. As the United States (US) Army later pointed out, this census was of 
limited value as it required extrapolation to update its figures for the start of the war. Any 
error in the assumption of how the population had developed in the intervening four years up 
to 1914 would make the base figure of manpower calculations inaccurate, producing 
problems which could not be rectified once hostilities had begun.17 The main sources for 
German losses were casualty lists published almost daily by Germany for the different armies 
of Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemberg.18 They provided information on casualties, 
initially in detail down to the location of wounds. Such a wealth of information raised 
suspicions, especially among professional soldiers. Doubters often cited deception as a reason 
to ignore the lists, holding that the Germans deliberately under-reported losses so to uphold 
morale at home. Yet even if the lists were genuine, whether the Germans could accurately 
record their own casualties in this conflict of unprecedented scale was unclear. Other open 
sources, mostly in the form of German and Austrian press reports, magazines, Trades Unions 
year-books, and parish statistics, offered lists on the status of local soldiers – principally 
indicating whether they had become a casualty. But these sources were limited in their 
sample, forcing statisticians to extrapolate these figures to a wider population – posing 
problems if the sample proved anomalous.19 
 Several closed sources provided useful intelligence on manpower and attrition. 
Prisoners of war (POWs) could be useful even if uncooperative: their mere age and physical 
condition illustrated the quality of manpower in the German army. Moreover, they often were 
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caught with Soldbucher (pay books) that listed roll call numbers, which indicated the number 
of replacement they represented in a company, providing evidence of how much attrition had 
been inflicted on that unit. Intercepted letters sent to POWs in England illuminated recruiting 
policies in Germany. But these sources similarly provided only small samples and could also 
be anomalous – some ‘unfit’ Germans may well have found a uniform regardless of recruiting 
standards, which varied from one part of the country to another. Secret service agents were 
better at providing strategic than operational-level intelligence, but still failed on this point; 
‘the true state of German reserves was also marked by a continual absence of agent 
reporting’.20 
 Using combinations of these sources, the British sought to assess German manpower. 
The first efforts occurred over the winter of 1914-15. This work was undertaken by eminent 
figures such as Lord Haldane, who was Lord Chancellor and a senior minister involved in the 
direction of the war, having helped to create the modern British Army while serving as 
Secretary of War in previous years.21 Also involved was Charles Oman, a prominent military 
historian.22 Despite this, these estimates were lackadaisical and politicized.23 Seeking to ease 
his colleagues’ restlessness for action so that he might keep his expanding army out of the 
firing line until the time arrived to wreck the remnants of the German army, Kitchener24 
ordered Charles Callwell, Director of Military Operations,25 ‘to prove that the Germans will 
run out of men within the next few months’.26 Callwell made dubious calculations to show 
that the Allies had greater reserves, and victory was only a matter of time. He and Kitchener 
knew that his conclusions were nonsense, Callwell claiming that he was ‘graded in the 
“doubting Thomas” class’ regarding such mathematical exercises, and that he could have 
argued the opposite case with ease.27 
 Others worked tirelessly throughout 1915 to answer these questions. Their approach 
matured and became more professional, rooted in more realistic methodologies than 
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Callwell’s assumptions. Yet the problem still could not be solved. These more rigorous efforts 
provoked new questions and hit a significant barrier: could the German casualty lists, the 
critical source of data on attrition, be trusted? Civilian experts, familiar with statistics, and 
professional soldiers, familiar with the front, weighed in this issue, ultimately on opposite 
sides. The civilians wanted to believe the lists were genuine, perhaps because if so they 
would be tremendously useful. The soldiers wanted to prove them a German lie, for the lists 
were unpleasant reading to officers who believed that the opening year of the war must have 
been harder on the Germans than the allies. 
 S. J. H. W. Allin of the National Insurance Commission argued that the lists were not 
a German deception.28 General George Macdonogh, soon to become Director of Military 
Intelligence (DMI), claimed the opposite, citing the lack of clear ordering of casualties.29 He 
preferred to examine figures from trade unions and parish magazines, interpreted through 
analogies of British and French losses, which produced far higher estimates.30 Sir Claud 
Schuster, Permanent Secretary to the Lord Chancellor’s Office, challenged these sources, 
which were too eccentric and small a sample to be relied on. While the lists gave only a 
minimum figure, they had not been falsified.31  
  Modern technology seemed a means to solve the problem of the disorganized lists 
which Macdonogh cited. The Civil Service had insufficient tabulating machines for this 
purpose, but the Prudential Assurance Company had installed the largest battery of punch 
card machines on earth in 1914.32 It offered assistance ‘in the most patriotic spirit’, and bore 
the cost of the staff sent to help with this endeavour.33 The Powers mechanical tabulating 
machines were highly advanced technology which recorded data on special cards. One card 
was used per casualty. Data was recorded on each card by punching holes in categories to 
indicate the nature of casualty, month of report, month of damage sustained, rank of man, 
class of man, regiment, whether Bavarian Regiment or not, and whether he belonged to an 
8 
 
ordinary or an Ersatz battalion. 300 of these cards could be punched per hour, sorted to 
produce information such as the number of casualties reported each month, divided according 
to rank. This effort was one of the earliest applications of data processing machines to 
intelligence analysis.34 In technical terms it was successful. It reduced the scale of the 
problem, yet could not eliminate it because of the limits to the quality of the data. 
 This quantitative work was augmented by expert analysts, including Allin and Mr. 
Hall of the Military Enquiries Section of the Official Press Bureau.35 Their analysis revealed 
some surprizes, such as fewer than 5% of the deaths being from sickness, meaning that a 
great traditional killer in war suddenly was marginalized. It also showed a trend of reduced 
German reporting on casualties from January onwards. Hall explained this tendency away as 
simply reflecting belated reporting: the early winter months were high in casualties as they 
contained late reports of losses suffered during the opening months of open warfare. In sum, 
‘the study of the lists increases one’s belief in them’. Even if they seemed low, the ‘safer 
view to adopt’ was that the lists were honest, instead of over-estimating German losses. Using 
the figures available from Prudential, Hall combined the records on manpower and attrition to 
make a forecast: the third year of war would be the time when Germany felt the strain of 
attrition – and if the lists are doctored ‘the catastrophe will come all the sooner’.36 This 
conclusion was remarkably accurate, but Hall’s methods of deducing the manpower of 
Germany were simplistic, and his figures fairly imprecise. 
 Despite Prudential’s work, the matter was not settled. Oman claimed that POWs were 
under-reported, but after a fresh inquiry Schuster demonstrated that Oman was exaggerating, 
and suspended further investigation on this case.37 Oman had been too hasty, but so was 
Schuster. In the following week he noted the appearance of entries of bischer nicht gemeldet 
(not previously reported). If the Germans had not published details of every missing soldier, 
Schuster’s stance was threatened.38 Yet even if the lists were trusted, many challenges 
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remained, for example ‘we do not know the number of wounded who return to service’.39 
Allin proposed a solution which used British figures and a comparative methodology, but 
recognized that it too was ‘problematical’.  
 These analysts had little solid information, and spent their time arguing about the 
reliability of one source largely because they had no better. Nevertheless, those in favor of the 
lists’ authenticity dominated in 1915.40 Still, Allin pessimistically mused, it is ‘impossible to 
make any definite estimate’ on total mobilizable manpower – ‘every statistician must form 
his own conclusion’.41 Even more, he accepted French estimates that future German losses 
would average only around 100,000 men per month, meaning that ‘too much must not be 
expected from attrition’.42 Allin was trying to assess the issue through a scientific approach, 
but the inability to answer fundamental questions about manpower and attrition meant that 
these findings could not be applied to strategy, the reason for the investigation in the first 
place. 
 
 
1916: THE ENEMY PERSONNEL COMMITTEE 
 
 Strategic assessment of Germany was not contained within the corridors of power. As 
the war ground on, newspapers made their own estimates. On 9 February 1916, The Times 
correctly defined the scale of the problem: only the Germans might have the means for exact 
calculation, while ‘the dim twilight’ of war would hinder the allies’ work. There was too little 
intelligence to offer accuracy; ‘the best estimate can only be an approximation to the truth’.43 
Still, Whitehall set out to answer these questions about manpower and attrition, spurred by 
necessity, for ‘by 1916 warfare had become a matter of calculation – of manpower 
resources... of how many casualties and prisoners it would take to break the enemy once and 
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for all’.44 The BEF soon would make its first great effort on the Somme, whereas the French 
army already was under mounting pressure from February 1916, bearing the brunt of 
Germany’s main effort for the year in the Battle of Verdun.45 
 On 10 May 1916 the War Committee established a secret46 sub-committee of the CID, 
the Enemy Personnel Committee (EPC) ‘to examine and report on the probable resources of 
the enemy in personnel at the present stage of the war’.47 This act was the first serious, 
organized bid to solve that problem. Instead of prolonged debate about the reliability of the 
lists, co-operation was encouraged. This aim was reflected in the composition of the 
committee: Sir Bernard Mallet, the Registrar-General, was made chairman, supported by 
civilian experts Dr. John Brownlee, Dr. T. H. C. Stevenson, and A. W. Flux from the Board of 
Trade. He would also be joined by military experts: Captain Edgar William Cox, of the 
Imperial General Staff, was Macdonogh’s protégé and a man soon to rise to the top of British 
Army intelligence.48 He was joined by Major C. L. Storr, Assistant Secretary of the CID.49 
Yet better organisation would not reduce the intelligence lacuna and the reliance on the same 
limited sources, nor were efforts made systematically to exploit material acquired by the 
British Army in France. 
 The committee addressed two interlinked but distinct questions. Manpower had 
received scant attention the previous year, but if the committee did not understand how many 
Germans could enter the field, their losses would be an isolated fact. In 1915, Brownlee was 
one of few students of this issue. Based upon the 1910 Census, and extrapolations from it, 
particularly via the use of life tables for Germany and death rates in peacetime Germany, his 
report was one of the first documents submitted to the EPC. It gave figures of 17,000,000 
men in Germany during 1914. Brownlee removed the number of men unfit for military 
service from this figure, relying on French experience and comparison with a small sample in 
the journal Deutsche Medicinische Wochenschrift, which gave answers over one million men 
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apart. In order to solve the next problem, the number of men retained in industry, Brownlee 
extrapolated from the Industrial Censuses of 1895 and 1907, assuming that the change in age 
distribution had continued uniformly – something he could not be sure of.50 These methods 
left ample room for mistake from the start. Schuster was ‘highly distrustful of Brownlee’s 
methods’, claiming he ‘moves about in a world of his own’.51 As such, in its first meeting on 
15 May 1916, the committee asked Brownlee to reassess the issue of manpower.52 
Unfortunately for the committee, the methods of 1915 had not advanced: the sources 
available simply could not provide a better answer. 
 The committee concluded that manpower could be estimated only by determining the 
number of males of military age and then deducting those unavailable to serve – as Brownlee 
had done. The assessment of physical unfitness must rely on the experience of what ‘another 
nation has done under similar circumstances’ – i.e. France. Deductions for industrial 
requirements could ‘only be guessed at, if argued on the intrinsic probabilities in view of the 
circumstances of each industry’.53 Small samples produced from German newspapers or 
POWs might be anomalous. Thus, again, the experience of France offered the best model. 
Therefore, in essence Brownlee had already submitted as useful a report as possible. This 
realisation fuelled the doubts which grew steadily throughout this process.  
 Brownlee, Mallet, Cox, and Flux were asked to establish total manpower via the 
Returns of the German Registrar General, with deductions of manpower rooted in 
comparisons with Britain and France.54 Despite being a state with a conscription system of 
comparable size, the French comparison presented further problems: on the same day that the 
committee requested these estimates, Cox received a French document translated by the War 
Office which outlined the French method of deducing German manpower. The French 
admitted that they could not precisely determine how many men they had drafted into their 
own army since the war began.55 Similarly, the EPC asked Flux to assess British manpower – 
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‘if it is found possible to do so’.56 The portents for assessing Germany were poor if the 
Entente powers could not assess themselves.57 
 Nevertheless, at its second meeting on 29 May, the EPC agreed that Germany could 
be assessed only through a proportional comparison with France, especially because, 
according to Flux, Germany required even more men in industry due to its isolation via 
blockade. The value of alternative sources also was debated. Flux dismissed Trade Union 
statistics, believing the percentages of mobilization they displayed were ‘so high as to make it 
doubtful what inference could be properly drawn’.58 Debate raged, meanwhile, about data on 
the mobilization of German railway staff. Brownlee held ‘that the railways and telegraphs 
were staffed by men past fighting’; Storr retorted that signalling work required men of 
‘considerable strength and fitness’.59 Both claims were supposition, demonstrating the limits 
to British knowledge. This incident at least demonstrated the benefits of working in a 
committee – such debates could occur rapidly rather than be prolonged over months of 
reports and replies. 
 The final discussion over manpower was the examination of Hilaire Belloc, a noted 
Anglo-French writer who had published his own strategic assessments of Germany in Land & 
Water since the war began.60 He had gained a reputation as an ‘expert’ on the matter, which 
the committee took seriously. The men at the front held a different view, and the trench 
newspaper The Wipers Times mocked him via spoof estimates written by a ‘Belary Helloc’.61 
Belloc held that a nation could mobilize between 10-13% of its total population in the first 
two years of hostilities. Belloc claimed that 8.5 million German men were mobilizable – 
under 13% of its population, without accounting for the requirements of industry.62 Before 
the committee, however, Belloc ‘disclaimed any special information’, and these views were 
challenged. Cox discredited Belloc’s belief that the 1889 class had not been mobilized; 
Belloc accepted Stevenson’s analysis that 13% mobilization was possible for a rapidly 
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increasing population. Belloc agreed that the deductions for men remaining in industry was ‘a 
question for experts’ – and he was not one. After being queried by Cox on the yield from the 
new classes, Belloc increased his figure for mobilizable men to 9 million, after deducting 
industrial requirements but including classes of men reaching fighting age.63 The mere fact 
that the EPC questioned Belloc, even calling him ‘skilled in the matter’ of assessing attrition, 
demonstrates their paucity of knowledge.64 An amateur making unfounded estimates thus 
deserved attention, because little else was at hand, though admittedly Belloc may have done 
as well as possible with publicly available sources. 
 Flux, Brownlee, and Stevenson were tasked with producing a final statement on 
manpower. Their report was completed on 26 June. They relied largely on the experience of 
France and the 1910 Census, with figures extrapolated to December 1915, so to determine the 
number of mobilizable men had peace continued. The report then estimated the expected 
number of deaths in peacetime, cross-checked with German life tables. This presented the 
problem of deducting certain deaths twice when war casualties also were removed from the 
total. For instance, a man expected to have died in 1915 had there been peace may actually 
have perished in battle that year, accounting for two deaths. After deducting immigrants and 
emigrants estimated from the 1910 Census, and adding Germans residing in Austria (but not 
elsewhere), the result was 13,550,000 men eligible for service in the classes 1889-1916. 
‘Serious question[s]’ might be asked of this formula, not least because of the limits to French 
statistics, but the committee believed that its methodology had reduced ‘the risk of serious 
error to small dimensions’.65 The statement nevertheless was scarcely optimistic. 
 Matters worsened when the committee failed to uncover any ratios for the proportion 
of unfit men across age groups, meaning they must adopt ‘various substitutes’, such as the 
rate of mortality as the presumed ratio of unfit men.66 A deduction of 23.8% unfit males 
ultimately was made, producing the final rounded figure of 10,700,000 Germans ‘fit and 
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available – had they been exposed merely to the risks of peace – in December 1915’.67 To this 
figure was added the class of 1917, which was estimated to yield 500,000 men fit for service, 
by arbitrarily rounding the rate of fitness to 25% as the youths would be less likely to meet 
fitness requirements. This gave a total of 11,200,000 men for the classes of 1889 to 1917. The 
1887-88 classes added another 370,000 men able to fight, plus 30,000 emigrants returned to 
Germany, bringing the committee’s estimate to 11,600,000 men – close to the DMI’s estimate 
of 11,500,000 men available.68 
 From this figure, the men remaining in industry had to be deducted to understand the 
potential strength of the German field army. Here again the French analogy was critical, but 
statistics from the Board of Trade on the drain of British manpower from industry, along with 
the knowledge that Germany could employ POWs and men from occupied lands, indicated 
that they might not need a larger proportion of men in industry than France. Determining a 
precise number required much conjecture. The committee utilized Trade Union membership 
statistics to argue that not many more than 1,700,000 men were being retained for industry.69 
Ultimately, the methodology to calculate manpower had not radically changed since 
Brownlee’s efforts in 1915. The committee had sought alternatives, but failed. Their final 
estimate rested on limited sources with no guarantee of accuracy. Whether the results were 
worth considering for the making of strategy was doubtful. 
 A trustworthy estimate for manpower proved elusive, but the matter of casualties – a 
number rather than an estimate of potential – appeared more likely to proffer certainty. 
Despite the united approach, doubts lingered about the lists. On 11th May, one day after the 
committee was created, a report noted that German units at Verdun were late in their reports. 
‘No less than 39 regiments have been silent as to their losses’.70 Whether this was mere 
belation or a deliberate cover-up was difficult to ascertain. Battle began over this point at the 
committee’s first meeting. Cox defined the army’s stance: ‘in the opinion of the D.M.I. no 
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reliable estimate could be based on the lists’.71 Schuster’s position remained unchanged: the 
‘lists were accurate in the sense that they give all the enemy knows, and not a selection of 
what he knows’.72 The lists should be treated as a minimum, with allowance for belation, and 
comparisons to the casualties of Britain, France, and Russia. Both sides accepted that 
comparative methods must be central in the committee’s analysis.73 It was thus decided that 
German losses should be checked against British statistics to prove their honesty.74  
 Belloc also was questioned about attrition. His assessments involved assumptions like 
estimating Austro-Hungarian losses as a fixed rate of 80% of Germany’s losses, trusting 
documents found on German officers without question, and assuming that total wastage 
always was five or six times the number of the dead.75 Belloc’s method was to work out ‘a 
rough minimum of the dead’, and project this number to produce a total of casualties ‘based 
upon the experiences of other belligerents’ – a mix of comparison and extrapolation.76 This 
suited his belief that the lists were only reliable on the reporting of the dead, although the 
figures provided had to be considered only 80% of the true total of killed, as there was 
consistent under-reporting.77 Belloc therefore did not believe that the lists were entirely 
falsified, but ‘suggested a test case’ to confirm whether they were accurate.78 This was 
exactly the sort of test which Schuster had shut down in 1915 as a waste of time. 
 A French memorandum explained why assessment of casualties was challenging. The 
author, while accepting that the lists might not be deliberate deception, claimed that this point 
was irrelevant: the issue is ‘whether [the Germans] resolved to take considerable pains to 
publish complete and accurate lists of their losses’. Committee members knew that lists were 
unlikely to be complete, and the issue was whether they could even be used as a base. The 
French report increased this problem. Indeed, ‘the example of France shows us that 
statements of losses drawn up day by day by the units in the field can be of no statistical 
value, especially in the case of the number killed’.79 Misreporting was rampant, many men 
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died in ambulances and field hospitals without being reported, and errors were difficult to 
correct. Not only were the German lists of doubtful use, but equally so was the chief method 
for assessing them, comparison with the French. 
 Comparative analysis therefore was abandoned by the French in favor of 
extrapolation from reports on small sections of German society, such as parishes, businesses, 
factories, banks, sporting and intellectual associations, and academic unions. Such sources, 
the only alternative if the lists were discarded, hardly were infallible. These were not wholly 
representative, and working-class losses probably were over-estimated. Such problems were 
balanced to some degree by other omissions, but the extent was unclear. Temporary losses 
like wounded men, meanwhile, could not be discerned from permanent losses. These issues 
forced a return to the comparative method based on the incomplete French statistics. This to-
ing and fro-ing depicts the problems with sources for assessors of attrition. The sources were 
so limited that any estimation must oscillate between two inadequate methods. Ultimately, the 
French report summed up the problem concisely: ‘We have not nearly enough data to enable 
us to form a direct estimate of German temporary losses’, which degraded all areas of this 
strategic assessment.80 
 In order to advance, the EPC had to decide on the reliability of the lists. While 
Stevenson increasingly doubted them, Cox and Schuster decided to collaborate on 
determining their authenticity. Both agreed that the lists provided at least a minimum – the 
issue was how much greater was the real number. The committee examined Joseph Burn, the 
Actuary of the Prudential Assurance Company, on the matter.81 This examination highlighted 
the link between these assessments and strategy. Burn claimed that the lists were 
‘substantially accurate’. The percentages for each type of casualty remained consistent across 
the month, arguments such as POWs not being reported frequently proved untrue, extensive 
corrections lists were published, and losses on which the British struggled to make an 
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estimate – for instance a raid on Zeebrugge – were reported fully, above British anticipation 
of the damage inflicted.82 Burn reached a worrying conclusion: ‘if the German casualty lists 
are correct, it would seem that time up to the present has not been on our side as regards to 
the exhaustion of “man power” but has definitely been against us’.83 This statement assumed 
that French losses matched the Germans, meaning that, with British and Belgian losses 
added, the Germans were inflicting more casualties than the Entente. This conclusion had 
significant implications for strategy: if Burn was right, it appeared that the Entente was 
losing.84 
 Burn’s stance may not have been purely sincere. While Prudential volunteered for this 
work, they were a business. Central to Burn’s recommendations to resolve this problem was 
to investigate using Prudential’s Powers machines further, which might thereby make ‘our 
reports... of immeasurably greater value’.85 Prudential stood to gain in prestige should the 
government favor these machines, and perhaps acquire government investment. This would 
support the uncertain future of their manufacturer, Powers Accounting Machine Company of 
America, for which Burn acquired the British Empire rights in 1919, and served as chairman 
of the British Powers Company.86 The Powers machines were still working on these statistics 
in 1917, so it was not an entirely unproductive encounter for the Actuary.87 
 Yet Burn endured a rocky session with the committee. Cox, joined by Schuster, 
highlighted errors such as the number of POWs the French had taken as against those noted 
on the lists. Burn soon rescinded swathes of his report: ‘my first estimate of the thing is very 
probably wrong’.88 He was not a military expert and had used newspaper reports to 
understand Verdun. Cox retorted: ‘You get your figure [for Verdun] from the press, and I am 
afraid it is not right. The statements you make are not made on reliable data’.89 Cox exposed 
Burn’s ignorance by ridiculing his comparison of the trench warfare of Verdun with the 
British experience of open warfare in 1914. Burn admitted ‘that the information has been 
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defective. But I think anyone trying to analyze the facts that I had before me would have 
come to the same conclusion’.90 Burn hit the nail on the head: the problem was analysing 
what few ‘facts’ there were. Burn made errors, but the committee did no better. 
 The final EPC report came before the end of June. A year after the debates between 
Macdonogh and Schuster, the committee still grappled with the value of the German casualty 
lists. Of course, this problem also was evolving – the Germans certainly were minimising 
details in 1916, and perhaps what began as honest reporting developed into intentional 
falsification.91 Ultimately, the EPC did not discard the lists, but asked ‘what amount of 
allowance should be made in our calculation for this abnormal retardation’?92 The committee 
‘can only say that it is possible, though not probable, that the percentage to be added on this 
account is so small as to be negligible’.93 Certain committee members maintained that the 
lists were falsified, but all agreed to accept these lists ‘with certain corrections and 
additions... as the basis of a minimum estimate’.94 This was not a promising start to the 
assessment.  
 To expand this minimum estimate, the committee made several assumptions: that 
belation normally was six weeks to two months, that the POWs listed above those actually 
held by the Entente should be added to permanent losses, whilst the number of deaths from 
wounds and sickness, and floating losses of men temporarily unavailable, should be 
calculated on the British experience. Comparison was key to methodology and a cause for 
doubt: differences in experience could make these estimates untrustworthy.95 The committee 
attempted to soften any criticism about inaccuracies – but this could not give policy-makers 
in Whitehall much faith in their findings, or willingness to apply the results to the waging of 
the war, the point of the exercise. 
 
 
19 
 
RESULTS 
 
 Over two years from the outbreak of war, on 9 September 1916 the EPC published 
their findings for the War Committee. It claimed that the classes 1889-1917 inclusive would 
provide 11,200,000 men for Germany.96 From this figure, the committee deducted 2,600,000 
as the number of casualties permanently lost up to 31 May 1916 (including 800,000 killed 
and died of wounds through to 31 January 1916 based on the lists, with the addition of 
154,108 men the Germans reported as missing but were not POWs in Allied hands, so were 
presumed dead), and a floating loss – soldiers temporarily out of action but able to return in 
due course – at 700,000 men.97 These losses, along with 1,000,000 men estimated training in 
depots, 200,000 men belonging to the navy (including casualties), 4,000,000 men at the front 
and 1,000,000 men on lines of communication, accounted for 9,500,000 of Germany’s 
11,200,000 manpower. The remaining 1,700,000 were employed in industry along with men 
unfit for service. 1,000,000 of them could not be removed for service if Germany was to meet 
its industrial needs (see Table 1). Their conclusion restated the source problems in plain 
terms. ‘Every item in our calculation is open in greater or lesser degree to question’, but 
because these numbers fit together and agreed with knowledge on Germany’s labor position, 
‘we are enabled to regard these conclusions with some confidence as an approximation to the 
truth’.98 
 On ‘the effect of summing items, each one of which is in greater or lesser degree 
conjectural’, the committee could now provide some conclusions.99 It put Germany’s 
reinforcements at 2,700,000: 1,000,000 in depots, 500,000 from the 1918 class, 500,000 more 
if the age of service was raised to 50, and 700,000 who could be stripped from industry (see 
Table 2).100 On these estimates, the EPC deemed that – should attrition continue at this rate – 
Germany could fight on for more than a year, and potentially two. These conclusions were 
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inconvenient to all sides. Emerging in the midst of the Battle of the Somme, they showed that 
success in attrition was a distant and costly objective, several ‘Sommes’ away. These figures 
even suggested that Germany was winning the war of attrition on the Western Front – yet 
they remained too uncertain to challenge the military strategy. This was a group of analysts 
lacking the sources needed to conduct a confident strategic assessment. They failed to reach a 
firm agreement on basic facts, and resorted to dubious methodologies of extrapolation and 
comparison.  
 Judging the accuracy of these assessments is contentious given the problems with 
Germany’s casualty records to this day, reflecting the challenge faced by the committee.101 As 
Philpott has noted regarding statistics for the Somme, ‘an accurate figure... will never be 
established’.102 Regardless, when it comes to shaping strategy, accuracy of results is less 
important than faith in them by superiors. The doubt-riddled report of 1916 inspired little 
confidence. The effort to understand German manpower and attrition failed to move from a 
parlor game designed to sway colleagues, as with Callwell, into a reliable source for strategy. 
Insofar as they were believed, these figures would have discredited the arguments for 
attrition, but only on the margin. The importance of this work was with what it could not do, 
as against what it achieved. 
 
 
1917: THE SEARCH FOR VICTORY 
 
 In the middle of a war of attrition, Britain had no means to measure its success. 
Despite staggering losses, the question was not whether to continue the war, but how to do so. 
The Somme had been bloody and not obviously a victory. When Lloyd George became Prime 
Minister in December 1916, he was intent on avoiding repetition. He preferred a ‘New 
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Eastern’ strategy of tangible victories in the Middle East and Italian Front, to shore up public 
support for fighting the war to a victorious conclusion.103 Fearful that the war might end in a 
compromise peace following the dismal Nivelle offensive in spring 1917, Lloyd George 
sought to safeguard British interests by bolstering its imperial position rather than by pouring 
unnecessary manpower into the trenches. This was not how soldiers saw the matter. The 
Somme had been critical in wearing down the Germany army, and ‘two Sommes at once’104 
was the solution of General Sir Henry Wilson to defeat Germany in 1917 – in principle an 
accurate assessment, in practice a terrifying one.105 This debate raged, allowing Lloyd George 
to argue that attrition should halt, and the army that it must continue. The differences between 
the new Prime Minister and his military leaders led to a significant civil-military split.106 
Meanwhile, France must be aided on the Western Front, and British and French generals 
accepted ‘the default position [of] further attrition’.107  
The Battle of Arras could not be halted, but the main effort for 1917 seemed to be up 
for debate. Haig, who had replaced Field Marshal Sir John French as commander-in-chief of 
the BEF at the end of 1915 and oversaw the offensive on the Somme, supported another 
major offensive in Flanders to take German naval bases on the Belgian coast, so to assist the 
Royal Navy. Lloyd George preferred to fight against the Austro-Hungarians and the 
Ottomans. British desperation at sea against the U-boat blockade and the need to support the 
faltering Russians and French forced Britain to carry the strategic burden for the Entente. For 
Haig, an attack in Flanders would be the best way to do so. While few U-boats were stationed 
in the Belgian ports, taking the Flanders coast would neutralize surface raiders, affording 
greater protection to the Channel crossing for the army’s supplies. This would be progress for 
the Royal Navy. An offensive also would pin German reserves to the British sector, denying 
the German army the ability to inflict further misery on the French army, which needed time 
to recover from the mutinies in the aftermath of the Nivelle offensive. As late as September 
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this matter worried Haig, and he noted the French General Philippe ‘‘Pétain’s opinion [that] 
its discipline is so bad that it could not resist a German offensive’’. Yet more than 
ameliorating Allied deficiencies, Haig believed that an attack in Flanders held the possibility 
of defeating Germany. Twelve miles beyond Ypres lay Roulers, a vital railway junction. 
Taking this hub would significantly disrupt German logistics, and potentially prompt a 
withdrawal from the region. Coupled with the realisation that their guerre de course in the 
Atlantic would fail, Haig claimed that ‘‘the possibility of the collapse of Germany before the 
next winter becomes appreciably greater’’. This would be another wearing out battle, but one 
that promised territorial rewards as well as attrition of the enemy which meant ‘‘Germany 
may well be forced to conclude peace on our terms before the end of the year’’.108 While not 
in agreement with Haig’s views, Lloyd George could not simply ignore Haig and Robertson, 
the CIGS, as he depended ‘on the support of Unionist members of parliament and the 
Northcliffe press that backed’ the pair.109 However, they must show their masters that this 
battle, called Third Ypres, was essential. 
 To do so Haig exploited his own intelligence assessments, conducted at the front by 
General Headquarters (GHQ). GHQ Intelligence was rooted in the British Army tradition of a 
commander controlling field intelligence. Macdonogh deployed to the Western Front in 1914 
at the head of a small section of six staff officers, comprising the entirety of GHQ 
Intelligence. This grew in size (to 23 officers) and remit as the war continued so to meet new 
challenges. Given this ‘haphazard evolution’ of British intelligence, analytical responsibilities 
were not clearly defined.110 While army intelligence had developed in London with the 
creation of bodies such as the Directorate of Military Intelligence in December 1915, Haig 
nevertheless had a right to make his own assessments. These were organized by his Brigadier 
General Intelligence (BGI) John Charteris, by methods as fallible as those of the EPC. 
Charteris relied on intelligence completely under his own command, and therefore was 
23 
 
challenged from the outside, but not decisively. His assessments were based primarily on 
classes and divisions, a reasonable means of considering German replenishment. By 
calculating the proportion of prisoners by age classes, Charteris claimed he could estimate 
when it had been used up: ‘when a class furnishes more than 15 to 16% of prisoners, then that 
class has ceased to exist as a draft-furnishing source’.111 He claimed that by the middle of 
1917 the members of the 1918 class all were in service and the 1919 class was in or near the 
trenches. The movements of divisions enabled Charteris to make further claims about 
wastage. Every division withdrawn exhausted from the front was presumed to have taken 
3,200 casualties. By this model, Charteris estimated that the Germans had suffered 100,000 
total casualties in Flanders and Lens between mid-July and late August 1917.112 His estimate 
of German losses on the British section of the front for the whole of 1917 increased the 
divisional figure to 3,500 casualties, producing an estimate of 710,500 casualties for German 
divisions engaged in severe fighting. He added a further 285,120 casualties to this figure by 
deciding that each German company on the British section of the front not engaged in battle 
had suffered an average of 5.5 casualties per week. Therefore by Charteris’ estimates, the 
Germans had suffered almost one million casualties on the British section of the front alone 
in 1917.113 This method was based on a French system, although Charteris inflated his 
figures.114 
 Despite being arbitrary, these methods were generally accepted, both by the French 
and the Americans. However, they were prone to problems caused by extrapolating from 
small samples – Charteris’ conclusion on the 1918 class rested on an analysis of a mere 3,669 
POWs captured in July 1917. German published losses later indicated that only 4.7% of 
July’s losses were from the 1918 class. Charteris’ sample probably was anomalous, caused 
because Germany was filling gaps with new recruits on the front facing the British, where 
fighting was hardest. Moreover, Germany had recalled skilled, older men to help bring in the 
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harvest of 1917 following the bungled harvest of 1916.115 Therefore Charteris’ methods 
suffered from similar flaws to those of the EPC. 
 The most in-depth analysis conducted by GHQ, in conjunction with the French War 
Ministry, was the analysis of Soldbucher. The initial French effort was disorganized, so 
Charteris improved it by sending two British women to work on ordering the sacks of 
captured Soldbucher. They sought to uncover what number of replacement a soldier was in a 
company, as indicated in the pay book, and then to plot this data onto graphs. This work 
continued into 1918 when Cox was promoted once again, this time replacing Charteris as 
BGI. However, he had little interest in these ‘elaborate conclusions’ of limited value.116 
Evidently Cox had become jaded about the prospect of assessing attrition, a problem which 
he knew was not solvable. 
 However, GHQ treated its assessments of attrition with supreme confidence. Charteris 
believed intelligence officers should ‘have the courage of [their] opinions’.117 Haig disliked 
pessimistic claims on attrition; the BGI had to be wary of submitting assessments he would 
not appreciate. Charteris, promoted at Haig’s behest, needed to retain his chief’s patronage.118 
He turned out optimistic assessments of German manpower which probably he believed were 
true, but certainly were motivated to support Haig. This behaviour was unprofessional and 
warrants criticism, which came from the War Office and Macdonogh. The DMI told Charteris 
that his manpower assessments of August 1916 were wrong. The use of French estimates to 
claim that the German 1918 class could not take the field until 1917 implied that Germany 
would be exhausted by the end of 1916. Charteris sought to smooth this dispute by agreeing 
that German reserves would not be ‘irretrievably’ exhausted as new reserves would emerge in 
1917.119 Disagreements continued for another year, with Charteris focusing on the 
deployment of divisions to make his estimates about casualties, and deeming German 
casualties to be ‘higher in resisting the more prolonged, more intense and successful fighting 
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on the British front’ than against unsuccessful French assaults.120 Macdonogh rejected 
Charteris’ estimates, finally stating ‘I don’t think anything is to be gained by pursuing the 
question of casualties, you have our opinion and we have yours and there is nothing more to 
be said... as you said in your letter, [it is] a matter of opinion’.121 Both men decided that they 
needed more data before resuming the discussion.122 Thus one of the most supportive officers 
of GHQ rejected a key part of its view, because he recognized how dubious these claims 
were. Even Haig’s subordinates were doubtful: General Sir Henry Rawlinson stated that they 
would know when the Germans were broken ‘instinctively. It will not be a matter of 
conjecture built upon the reports of prisoners and deserters’.123 
 Haig used Charteris’ assessments to back his arguments over strategy against Lloyd 
George. He used these to claim that there would be ‘at least a German manpower crisis before 
the winter... as the main foundation in his announcement to the Cabinet that the Germans 
could be defeated in 1917’.124 This claim was ‘based not on mere optimism but on a thorough 
study of the situation’.125 Haig’s memorandum came with an appendix, likely authored by 
Charteris, which claimed that the reduced number of battalions, break up of regiments, and 
poor physical specimens of prisoners, indicated that the German army was ‘within four to six 
months of the total exhaustion of her available manpower’.126 Indicatively, Robertson 
suppressed this appendix as he rejected its conclusions. Both Robertson and Macdonogh, 
supporters of Haig’s strategy, rejected the accuracy of the assessments of attrition which 
underpinned it.127 They thought these claims actually weakened the case. Haig initially 
accepted Robertson’s decision in writing, before outflanking him and presenting Charteris’ 
verdict to the Cabinet Committee on War Policy verbally during his crucial visit to London to 
confirm his Third Ypres plans.128 On 19 June Haig stated that ‘Germany was within 6 months 
of the total exhaustion of her available manpower, if the fighting continues at its present 
intensity’, emphasising ‘the evidence of the captured company rolls, which all pointed in this 
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direction’.129 Beach argues that Charteris’ estimates were based on insufficient evidence, and 
‘Haig’s opinions influenced the intelligence assessment rather than vice versa’.130  
 The balance of intelligence ensured that even if Lloyd George doubted Haig’s claims 
that he could win in 1917, he could not disprove him.131 The EPC could not give London the 
confident assertions which Charteris fed Haig. Their effort, despite using the most advanced 
data processing available, added only to the confusion. Lloyd George failed to overturn Haig 
and Robertson during their cross examinations in June, and given the political circumstances 
had no alternative but to approve the Flanders offensive on 16 July. While he still did not 
support the offensive, ‘the politicians would not obstruct the soldiers’ plans’.132 This decision 
was driven by fears of a French collapse. No other course offered the prospects that an attack 
in Flanders did. Haig outmanoeuvred Lloyd George by getting French and Belgian support 
for his plan, preventing a switch to the Italian front once Third Ypres began. The Prime 
Minister clung to the caveat that the attack could be halted if it turned into another Somme, 
revealing only his lack of understanding of ‘the confusion and ambiguity which riddled the 
tactical planning of the battle’ and prevented any clean break from it.133 
 The EPC’s second report was published in September 1917, with Third Ypres in full 
flow. This report, revised to 30 April 1917 for Germany, was written with Sir Julian Corbett, 
a naval theorist and historian,134 and Sir Mackenzie Chalmers, a legal expert, added to bolster 
the EPC’s capabilities.135 Due to lingering doubts over calculations in the first report, and the 
likelihood of getting figures wrong via extrapolation the longer the war continued, the 
committee decided to focus solely on calculating the number of German reserves left. Even 
then, it found it problematic ‘to suggest a particular figure for any remaining untrained 
reserve’.136 The committee was ordered to produce a fresh estimate for men retained in 
industry, but found the data available still ‘very unsatisfactory’.137 
 The most striking change was the decision to drop the casualty lists as a key source. 
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Retardation of reportage was so significant that they no longer were useful as a basis. Instead, 
the committee paid attention to methods employed by the DMI. Arbitrary classifications were 
assigned to enemy units based on the intensity of fighting it had encountered that month. The 
three classifications were heavy fighting, normal trench warfare, or resting. Each category 
reflected an anticipated amount of losses, deducted as a percentage from that unit’s strength. 
These percentages were based on British and French experience. Thus, if an enemy unit had 
been in normal trench warfare for one month, it would be assumed that it had suffered 6.15% 
losses for that period (with a subsequent deduction of 20% of the resulting figure ‘to allow 
for the more rapid expansion of the British army and for the greater liveliness of the British 
front’). This methodology was similar to Charteris’, but arguably more sophisticated. 
Projections also were made from small data sets, namely deaths of teachers.138 The verdict 
remained bleak: ‘no estimate of German casualties at the present stage of the war can be 
regarded as other than an approximation, containing very considerable possibilities of error’. 
The allowed margin for error on casualties was half a million men – almost one quarter of the 
total that Germany was estimated to suffer in 1917.139 Also questioned was the use of 
comparative analysis in assessing industrial requirements: since ‘the circumstances of 
countries differ so widely that the practice of one cannot be inferred from that of another’, the 
estimates could not be made ‘with any approach to accuracy’.140 Other modifications 
included a higher percentage of men recruited from classes, as the bar for fitness had been 
lowered, allowing a poorer quality of recruit to serve, evidenced by German prisoners 
captured. 
 Doubts had deepened, and the utility of the committee dwindled further. The 
committee did not produce another report; the second report was the death knell for this form 
of strategic assessment. The effort to answer these questions had shown only that no sure 
answer could be found: London could not measure its success in this war of attrition, and 
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knew it. GHQ could not be refuted, and indeed by being put forward confidently, managed to 
weigh into the strategic debates of 1917 far more significantly than any work done by the 
EPC. The army had not attempted to de-rail the committee, but its failure was beneficial: 
GHQ preferred its own, subjective analysis to that of the War Office. With the end of the 
EPC, Haig’s right to an independent assessment now became the only strategic assessment of 
manpower and attrition. The end to the scientific efforts of the EPC saw the triumph of the 
sort of assessments Callwell had written to please Kitchener at the start of the war. This 
continued even after Haig’s claims that Third Ypres would destroy the German army by the 
end of the year proved false. From the summer of 1918 Haig trusted his own gut instincts 
over any input from his intelligence staff.141 The British war effort stumbled in the dark 
without intelligence to illuminate the way forward. Attrition was irrational as it could not be 
measured – but there was no alternative if the Central Powers were to be beaten. The German 
army had to be ground down in the main theatre of the war, regardless of whether that 
progress could be measured. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Ultimately, the attempt to assess German manpower and attrition failed. The sources 
were inadequate to enable such an effort. The census was outdated, requiring extrapolation 
and leaving it open to error. The casualty lists could not be fully trusted. All other sources 
took small, potentially anomalous samples, either from Trade Unions or POWs. This 
intelligence lacuna prevented the committee from producing confident estimates. Moreover, 
‘analytical methods were probably the weakest part of the British intelligence system’.142 The 
methods of extrapolating and comparing deployed by the committee could not produce 
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certain intelligence. These problems skewered the strategic assessment of manpower and 
attrition in London. Charteris worked under the same restraints, but overstated the certainty in 
his estimates for political reasons. Strategic assessment ultimately returned to its most 
primitive roots, with Haig’s instinct taking the place of Prudential’s tabulating machines. This 
was not a rational way to pursue a strategy of attrition.  
Moreover, in the strategic debates of 1917, the decision to attack in Flanders was not 
the result purely of the need to aid Britain’s allies, or the Royal Navy. Intelligence 
assessments of the enemy played an important role. Yet what proved crucial in the absence of 
certainty and accuracy in these assessments was confidence, false or not, in using estimates to 
influence the making of strategy. Consequently, this research demonstrates that the traditional 
views in the literature retain some merit. The decision to create and put into the field a 
continental army was not one based on a clear understanding of what precisely needed to be 
done to win the war, or whether it could be won. The bid to assess attrition began in earnest 
only once the war had reached a point of no return, and it was clear that it would be long and 
costly. London sought to understand whether its strategy could succeed only after it had fully 
committed to it – and found that it was not possible to tell conclusively. Yet Britain’s strategy 
of attrition was one which was born out of necessity. As Philpott has explained, there was no 
alternative.143 
 Assessing attrition is a difficult proposition for intelligence communities. It has not 
proven easier since 1918. The Second World War was as much a war of attrition as the first. 
Here strategic assessment also caused problems, most notably the debate over how far the 
Combined Bomber Offensive actually was damaging the German war economy.144 Again, the 
order of battle controversy in the Vietnam War erupted from the effort to understand the 
strength of the North Vietnamese, the attrition inflicted, and whether the US was 
‘winning’.145 The US sold its strategy on the ‘cross-over point’, which would be reached 
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when the North Vietnamese ran out of reserves. The American military felt the pressures 
confronted by Charteris and Cox of ensuring that they were winning.146 Whilst the inability to 
solve this problem did not prevent Britain from winning its war of attrition in however costly 
a fashion, the falseness of this cross-over point in Vietnam came back to haunt Washington, 
when the supposedly exhausted North Vietnamese attacked during the Tet holiday of 1968. 
While the campaign proved a tactical defeat for North Vietnam, the shock of this incorrect 
assessment of enemy manpower reserves weakened the US in strategic terms. The problem of 
assessing enemy personnel in asymmetric warfare and defining victory has hindered other 
counter-insurgency campaigns since. 
 Successfully overcoming this problem of assessing attrition requires good, detailed, 
and trusted intelligence on one’s enemy, such as the intelligence Ultra provided in the attack 
on the U-boats in the spring of 1943. Once extrapolation and calculation becomes necessary, 
the margin for error begins to irreversibly widen. Failure to gauge the success of attrition may 
make little difference in the end – or it may lead to disaster if too much stock is put into 
solving the problem. Either way, in total wars and counter-insurgency campaigns the civil-
military organs of states must grasp the problem if they are to pursue a strategy of attrition. 
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